Oliver Middleton is a member of the Conservative Party and a former member of the Labour Party PPC.
Defeats are always hard, but suffering one of the magnitude of that of July 4 shakes any political party deeply. In these circumstances, the desire to avoid a situation in which an overly emotional and reactive decision could be taken is quite understandable. That is why the decision of the 1922 Committee to opt for a prolonged vote to elect the party leader makes a lot of sense.
However, while this timetable has clear advantages, we must be aware of the risks involved in being without a permanent leader for four months. Labour knows these only too well and will be keen to make the most of them.
Fast forward to May 2010. David Cameron has just become the first Conservative Prime Minister.
The Labour Party has suffered its own significant defeat after a long period in government. True, it was not on the scale of 4 July, and Labour may have exceeded pre-election expectations, which were very low. But, as we know, going from governing the country to being in opposition in a matter of hours, as our system demands, is brutal.
In the case of the Labour Party, in 2010, as now, figures across the party were quick to point out the danger of not taking the time to fully understand and digest the result. This required a prolonged period of “debate”. This, they said, was the only way to avoid a knee-jerk reaction that could lead to the party having the “wrong” leader.
As a result, the Labour Party also chose to elect its leader within a period of almost five months. The leader that Labour ended up choosing? Ed Miliband, who oversaw an even more disastrous election defeat than that of 2010 and created the conditions that allowed Jeremy Corbyn to become leader.
Although circumstances differ and there are counterexamples, such as the election of David Cameron in 2005, we must remember that longer leadership contests do not automatically lead to better leaders and results.
Leaving aside the Labour Party, we must also bear in mind that when one is forced to think about a decision over a longer period, whether in politics or in life in general, one reaches a point where it is difficult to recall with such clarity the facts and experiences on which one bases the decision.
In these circumstances, rewritings of recent history also become easier and more common; instinctive or visceral decisions, which science tells us are valuable, meaningful and should not be ignored, take a backseat. This carries real risks if we are unable to see beyond them.
However, there is an even greater risk associated with longer leadership contests, and one we must avoid falling victim to at all costs.
Let us briefly return to 2010 and the experience of the Labour Party. Having been a member of the Labour Party and a parliamentary candidate in 2015, I know how much the Labour Party regrets having opted for a five-month leadership.
Why? Because, rightly or wrongly, in his view, it allowed Cameron and George Osborne to set the narrative with little questioning. In this case, it was about reinforcing the connection between Britain’s poor finances and Labour’s economic competence, or lack thereof. In 2015, I remember how damaging this was for Labour, and how difficult it was to challenge it once that narrative was established.
It was undoubtedly a great political move, based on a significant element of truth (and some help from Liam Byrne), but there is no doubt that Cameron and Osborne were effectively shooting at an empty net. There are already signs that Sir Keir Starmer and Rachel Reeves are trying to repeat this.
In 2010, Labour consoled itself by pointing out that Harriet Harman was a capable stand-in leader. Yet, as Rishi Sunak will discover in the coming months, despite his commendable humility and grace in the face of defeat, the public rarely listens to someone who knows they will not be prime minister in the future – frankly, neither do large sections of the media.
The interim leaders themselves are also naturally cautious, aware that they only have a limited mandate, which, not for lack of trying, makes it more difficult to fulfil what is now our constitutional duty as Her Majesty’s Official Opposition.
How can we mitigate these risks? Recognizing them is half the battle, but more importantly, we must not lose sight of the task at hand: holding this government accountable as it seeks to return us to the era of the omnipotent and omniscient state.
This means that Sunak and the vast majority of the Cabinet, who chose not to stand, must concentrate on this task, without allowing their attention to be divided between their shadow candidacies and supporting the candidate they want (this is also where Labour became destabilised).
Unlike Harman, who always had one hand tied behind his back, Sunak must be given the space and confidence to act as permanent leader of the opposition in all but name. After all, less than a month ago he was running the country.
Some may argue that this is undemocratic, but it is the only way to ensure that his status as interim leader does not dilute the Conservative response to Labour’s attacks. While of course Sunak as interim leader cannot set out specific policy positions, he should still feel able to articulate what a Conservative alternative might look like in terms of values and priorities for the country; the why, rather than the what.
As a relatively new member of the party, I trust that the members of the 1922 Committee have made the right decision and fully recognize the rationale. I am simply speaking from experience.
Remember how easy it is to give ground and lose focus in this crucial period, which means that whoever becomes our new leader will begin a difficult task even more on the defensive. This is something we cannot accept.
